This study analyzes the cross-country e¤ects of in ‡ation on innovation and international technology transfer via cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on R&D investment. We consider a scale-invariant North-South quality-ladder model that features innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. We …nd that a higher in ‡ation in the South causes a permanent decrease in the rate of international technology transfer, a permanent increase in the North-South wage gap, and a temporary decrease in the rate of Northern innovation. A higher in ‡ation in the North causes a temporary decrease in the rate of Northern innovation, a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap, and an ambiguous e¤ect on the rate of international technology transfer depending on the relative size of the two economies. We also calibrate the model to China-US data and …nd that the cross-country welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation is quantitatively signi…cant from the North to the South, but not from the South to the North. Speci…cally, permanently decreasing in ‡ation to achieve the Friedman rule in the US leads to a welfare gain of 3.28% in the US and a welfare gain of 3.31% in China. However, permanently decreasing in ‡ation to achieve the Friedman rule in China leads to much smaller welfare gains of 0.34% in China and 0.17% in the US.
Introduction
In this study, we explore the cross-country e¤ects of in ‡ation on innovation and international technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) in a scale-invariant NorthSouth quality-ladder growth model that features innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. Multinational …rms invest in adaptive R&D in the South to transfer the production of the highest quality products from the North to the South in order to take advantage of the lower Southern wage rate. To model money demand, we impose cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on R&D investment, which is costly and subject to cash requirements in reality; see for example Chu et al. (2015) for a discussion of empirical evidence. Early empirical studies, such as Hall (1992) and Opler et al. (1999) , show a positive and signi…cant relationship between R&D expenditures and cash ‡ows in US …rms. From 1980 to 2006, the average cash-to-assets ratio in US …rms increased substantially, and Bates et al. (2009) argue that this trend is partly driven by the …rms' increasing R&D expenditures. Brown and Petersen (2011) show that …rms smooth their R&D expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves. Berentsen et al. (2012) argue that information frictions and limited collateral value of R&D capital require …rms to …nance R&D projects with cash. Falato and Sim (2014) use …rm-level data in the US to show that …rms'cash holdings increase (decrease) signi…cantly in response to a rise (cut) in R&D tax credits. These results suggest that due to …nancial frictions, …rms need to use cash to …nance their R&D investment. We capture these cash requirements on R&D by imposing CIA constraints on innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. Within this monetary growth-theoretic framework, we derive the following results.
A higher in ‡ation in the South causes a permanent decrease in the rate of international technology transfer via the Southern CIA constraint on adaptive R&D. A higher in ‡ation in the South also has the following general-equilibrium e¤ects: a permanent increase in the North-South wage gap, and a temporary decrease in the rate of innovation in the North. Intuitively, a higher in ‡ation in the South raises the cost of adaptive R&D, which in turn reduces the incentives for international technology transfer. As a result, less products are manufactured by Southern …rms and more products are produced by Northern …rms. The higher demand for production labor in the North reduces R&D labor, which in turn decreases the rate of Northern innovation but only temporarily due to the semi-endogenous-growth property of the model. Finally, given that a higher in ‡ation in the South has a direct negative e¤ect on the demand for Southern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in the South relative to the North.
A higher in ‡ation in the North causes a temporary decrease in the rate of Northern innovation via the CIA constraint on innovative R&D in the North. A higher in ‡ation in the North also has the following general-equilibrium e¤ects: a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap, and an ambiguous e¤ect on the rate of technology transfer from the North to the South depending on the relative size of the two economies. Speci…cally, we …nd that if the Southern population size is su¢ ciently large (small), then an increase in the in ‡ation rate in the North would cause a permanent decrease (increase) in the rate of technology transfer from the North to the South. Intuitively, a higher in ‡ation in the North raises the cost of innovative R&D, which in turn reduces the incentives for innovation. As a result, the rate of innovation decreases temporarily. Given that a higher in ‡ation in the North has a direct negative e¤ect on the demand for Northern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in the North relative to the South. As for the e¤ects on the rate of international technology transfer, there are two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, it reduces the long-run level of aggregate quality, which reduces the di¢ culty of adaptive R&D due to the property of increasing R&D di¢ culty in the semi-endogenous growth model. 1 This is a positive e¤ect on international technology transfer. On the other hand, the higher in ‡ation in the North also reduces the incentives for adaptive R&D because there are less bene…ts from FDI due to the smaller North-South wage gap. This negative e¤ect on international technology transfer via adaptive R&D labor in the South is relatively strong when the Southern labor force is large. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of a higher in ‡ation in the North on technology transfer would be negative (positive) if the Southern population size is su¢ ciently large (small).
We also calibrate the model to China-US data in order to conduct a quantitative investigation on the cross-country e¤ects of in ‡ation via the CIA constraints. We …nd that permanently decreasing in ‡ation to achieve the Friedman rule (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate) in the US would raise the wage gap between the US and China by 0.471% (percent change) and surprisingly decrease the ‡ow of technology transfer from the US to China by 1.257% (percent change). Decreasing in ‡ation in the US also leads to welfare gains that are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 3.281% in the US and 3.312% in China. These signi…cant welfare gains are due to a large increase in the level of technology by 8.068%. Therefore, the cross-country welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation is quantitatively signi…cant from the North to the South.
On the other hand, permanently decreasing in ‡ation to achieve the Friedman rule in China would reduce the wage gap between the US and China by 0.469% and increase the ‡ow of technology transfer from the US to China by 1.492%. Also, it leads to relatively small welfare gains of 0.338% in China and 0.174% in the US. These small welfare gains are partly due to the small increase in the level of technology by 0.361%. In other words, reducing in ‡ation in China leads to a much smaller increase in the level of technology than reducing in ‡ation in the US. This …nding is due to innovation originating from the North. 2 In the literature on in ‡ation and economic growth, Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985) analyze a CIA constraint on capital investment in a monetary version of the Neoclassical growth model. Subsequent studies in this literature explore the e¤ects of monetary policy in variants of the capital-based growth model. This study instead associates more closely with a related literature on in ‡ation and innovation-driven growth. In this literature, Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) is the seminal study that analyzes the e¤ects of in ‡ation via a CIA constraint on consumption in a variant of the variety-expanding model in Romer (1990) . 3 In contrast, we explore the e¤ects of in ‡ation in a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Chu and Lai (2013) . 4 However, the present study di¤ers from all these studies by considering an open-economy two-country model, which enables us to explore the cross-country e¤ects of the CIA constraints on innovation and international technology transfer. In this open-economy model, we …nd that in ‡ation in a country could lead to a sizable welfare e¤ect in another country, which is an important …nding that cannot be obtained in a closed-economy analysis. Chu et al. (2015) also analyze the e¤ects of in ‡ation in an open-economy Schumpeterian model, but they consider an environment with two Northern economies in the absence of North-South product cycles and technology transfer via FDI that characterize the interesting interaction between developed and developing economies. To our knowledge, this is the …rst study that explores the e¤ects of in ‡ation in the presence of North-South product cycles and technology transfer via FDI. Within this novel monetary growth-theoretic framework, we discover some interesting e¤ects of the CIA constraints on innovation and international technology transfer. The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 solves the steady-state equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of in ‡ation. The …nal section concludes.
A North-South monetary Schumpeterian model
The North-South quality-ladder growth model is based on Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) . The North-South R&D-based growth model originates from the seminal study by Grossman and Helpman (1991) . 5 The model in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) is a recent vintage of this class of models and has the advantage of being free of scale e¤ects by featuring semi-endogenous growth. 6 In the Dinopoulos-Segerstrom model, multinational …rms employ Northern R&D labor to invest in innovative R&D that improves the quality of products manufactured in the North. In order to take advantage of the lower production cost in the South, the multinational …rms then employ Southern R&D labor to invest in adaptive R&D that transfers the production of the highest quality products from the North to the South. After the manufacturing process of a product is transferred to the South, the multinational …rm faces the possibility of the product being imitated by domestic …rms in the South. To facilitate a realistic calibration to data, we generalize the Dinopoulos-Segerstrom model by introducing several parameters. Furthermore, to introduce money demand, we incorporate CIA constraints on innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. Then, we analyze the e¤ects of in ‡ation in the two countries on innovation and international technology transfer.
Households
In each country, there is a representative household. The lifetime utility function of the household in the North is given by
where c N t denotes per capita consumption in the North at time t, and the parameter > 0 determines subjective discounting. The population size, which is also the size of the representative household, in the North is L N t , which increases at an exogenous population growth rate g L > 0. To ensure that lifetime utility is bounded, we impose the following parameter restriction: > g L . For simplicity, we make a common assumption that f ; g L g are the same in the two countries. Total population in the world is
We use s L S t =L t to denote the share of world population in the South and 1 s L N t =L t to denote the share of world population in the North.
The household in the North maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation equation: For convenience, we reexpress the asset-accumulation equation in real terms (denominated in units of consumption goods).
7 It can be easily shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the rate of return on B N t must be equal to i N t . The intuition can be explained as follows. The opportunity cost for the household to hold cash is the nominal interest rate. Therefore, in order for the household to be willing to lend cash to …rms, it must be the case that …rms pay the nominal interest rate in return. If …rms pay less than the nominal interest rate, the household would not lend any cash to …rms. If they pay more than the nominal interest rate, the household would want to lend an in…nite amount of cash to …rms. 8 In the case of an additional CIA requirement on consumption, the CIA constraint in the North becomes P Given that we focus on inelastic labor supply for tractability, the CIA constraint on consumption would have no e¤ect on the equilibrium allocations, except for the real money balance. 9 See Section 2.4 for a discussion. 10 N t is the real value of the lump-sum transfer from the government. We follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to assume that there is a global …nancial market. In this case, the real interest rates in the two countries must be equal such that r N t = r S t = r t . 11 From standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
which implies that the growth rate of consumption is the same across countries.
Consumption goods
Consumption goods are produced by perfectly competitive …rms that aggregate a unit continuum of intermediate goods Y t (j) using the following CES aggregator:
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The resource constraint on C t is
where c S t is total consumption in the South. P N t is the price of consumption goods denominated in units of currency in the North. P S t is the price of consumption goods denominated in units of currency in the South. Given zero transportation cost, the law of one price holds such that P N t = t P S t , where t is the nominal exchange rate. For convenience, we will express all variables in real terms denominated in units of consumption goods that have the same value in the two countries. From pro…t maximization, we derive the conditional demand function for Y t (j) as
11 The nominal interest rates in the two countries would be di¤erent if in ‡ation rates di¤er across countries. However, even when the nominal interest rates di¤er across countries, there is no incentive for the household to hold foreign currency. The reason is that given the same real interest rate across countries as a result of the global …nancial market, di¤erences in the nominal interest rates are due to di¤erences in the in ‡ation rates, which in turn equal percent changes in the nominal exchange rate because the law of one price holds in our model as we discuss below. Therefore, a small transaction cost on foreign exchange would discourage the household from holding foreign currency. 12 The representative household in the South also performs an analogous dynamic optimization.
Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods j 2 [0; 1]. Some of these intermediate goods are produced in the North, and each of these Northern industries is temporarily dominated by a quality leader until the arrival of the next innovation. 13 The production function of intermediate goods manufactured by a quality leader in the North is
where the parameter z > 1 is the step size of a quality improvement, and n t (j) is the number of quality improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t. The …rm employs L N y;t (j) units of labor in the North for production. Given z nt(j) , the marginal cost of production for the industry leader is w N t =z nt(j) . 14 We follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to assume that new quality leaders are always able to charge the unconstrained monopolistic price because the closest competitors choose to immediately exit the market in equilibrium. 15 In this case, the monopolistic price charged by industry leaders is
To take advantage of the lower labor cost in the South, industry leaders in the North invest in adaptive R&D in the South in order to shift the manufacturing process to the South. 
where we have introduced > 0 as a labor-productivity parameter, which captures the productivity of Southern labor relative to Northern labor. The Southern a¢ liate employs L F y;t (j) units of labor in the South for production, and the marginal cost of production is w
, which is assumed to be less than w N t =z nt(j) .Given the marginal cost of production, the unconstrained monopolistic price is given by
The Southern a¢ liate produces the intermediate goods until the arrival of the next innovation in the North or until the current innovation is imitated by other …rms in the South. When the next innovation arrives, the manufacturing process shifts back to the North. To ensure that this return of production to the North occurs, we follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to assume w S t = > w N t =z, so that new quality leaders are able to drive out Southern a¢ liates of previous quality leaders.
Technologies of Southern a¢ liates may be imitated by other Southern …rms subject to an exogenous imitation rate . When this imitation occurs, the intermediate goods are 
and the perfectly competitive price is given by the marginal cost of production:
Southern competitive …rms produce the intermediate goods until the next innovation arrives at which point the manufacturing process shifts back to the North. Let's de…ne the aggregate quality index across industries j 2 [0; 1] as
where
1 . Then, we can derive the labor demands for an average-quality product produced by a Northern leader as
by a Southern a¢ liate asL
and by Southern competitive …rms as
Using these expressions, we can then express the labor demand for product j as
where o = fN; F; Sg. The amount of monopolistic pro…t earned by a Northern leader is
and the amount of monopolistic pro…t earned by a Southern a¢ liate is
Innovative and adaptive R&D
Innovative R&D is performed by entrepreneurs in the North. If an R&D entrepreneur employs Northern labor L N r;t (j) to engage in innovative R&D in industry j, then she is successful in inventing the next higher-quality product in the industry with an instantaneous probability given by
where the parameter > 0 inversely measures innovation productivity. q t (j) captures the e¤ect of increasing innovation di¢ culty, and it removes the scale e¤ect in the innovation process of the quality-ladder model as in Segerstrom (1998) . Here we introduce a positive R&D spillover e¤ect, 16 and the parameter N 2 [0; 1) measures the degree of this R&D externality. 17 The expected bene…t from investing in innovative R&D is v
is the real value of the expected discounted pro…ts generated by an innovation and ' N t (j)dt is the entrepreneur's probability of having a successful innovation during the in…nitesimal time interval dt. To facilitate the wage payment to R&D labor in the North, the entrepreneurs borrow domestic currency 18 from the domestic household. 19 The cost of borrowing is determined by the nominal interest rate i N t in the North. Therefore, the total cost of innovative R&D is
Given (20), the amount of R&D pro…t in the North is
. Adaptive R&D in the South is performed by local entrepreneurs and the Southern a¢ liates of Northern industry leaders. If the Southern a¢ liate of a Northern leader in industry j employs Southern labor L F r;t (j) to engage in adaptive R&D, then the Northern …rm is successful in shifting the production to the Southern a¢ liate with an instantaneous probability 16 See for example Ja¤e (1986), Nadiri (1988, 1989) and Los and Verspagen (2000) for empirical evidence on the presence of R&D spillovers across …rms. 17 The scaling by Q t in (19) is to ensure a steady-state value of ' N t (j). 18 Given that this is wage payment to workers in the domestic economy, the wage payment is naturally paid in domestic currency. Furthermore, there is no incentive for the entrepreneurs to borrow foreign currency and convert it into domestic currency even when the nominal interest rates di¤er across countries because uncovered interest rate parity holds in our model. 19 Due to the static nature of the R&D sector in the model, we cannot consider the case in which R&D entrepreneurs accumulate cash holdings. However, even if we allow entrepreneurs to accumulate cash, in ‡a-tion would have the same positive e¤ect on the cost of R&D as in our current setting in which entrepreneurs borrow cash from the household because the opportunity cost of using cash to …nance R&D is determined by the nominal interest rate in both cases. 20 Positive pro…t in the R&D sector can be justi…ed by the presence of a …xed factor input K N (j), which is implicitly normalized to unity. For example, this …xed factor input may be the entrepreneurial talent of R&D entrepreneurs in the speci…c industry. Given that not everyone possesses this entrepreneurial talent, there is no free entry in this industry generating a monopolistic rent that is captured by the entrepreneurs.
given by
where the parameter > 0 inversely measures adaptation productivity. q t (j) captures the e¤ect of increasing adaptation di¢ culty, and it removes the scale e¤ect in the adaptation process as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) . Here we introduce a positive spillover e¤ect of adaptive R&D, and the parameter F 2 [0; 1) measures the degree of this R&D externality. 21 The expected net bene…t for the Northern leader to invest in adaptive R&D is v
is the real value of the expected discounted pro…ts generated by the Southern a¢ liate and ' F t (j)dt is the probability of having a successful adaptation during the in…nitesimal time interval dt. To facilitate the wage payment to R&D labor in the South, the Southern a¢ liate borrows domestic currency from the domestic household, and the cost of borrowing is determined by the nominal interest rate i S t in the South. Therefore, the total cost of adaptive R&D is
Given that the net bene…t of adaptive R&D is increasing in L F r;t (j), the Southern a¢ liate engages in a positive …nite amount of adaptive R&D if and only if the following equilibrium condition holds:
Given (22), the amount of R&D pro…t in the South is
Finally, Southern a¢ liates face the risk of imitation (with an exogenous probability > 0) by other …rms in the South.
Stock market
The no-arbitrage condition that determines the value of v N t (j) is given by
. This condition equates the real interest rate r t to the asset return per unit of asset. The asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic pro…ts net of adaptive R&D expenditure and rent, 24 (22) and (23), we simplify the no-arbitrage condition to a more familiar expression given by
21 The scaling by Q N t (to be de…ned in Section 3.1) in (21) is to ensure a steady-state value of ' F t (j). 22 Once again, positive pro…t is the rent captured by local entrepreneurs who own a …xed factor input K S (j), which is normalized to unity. 23 It is useful to note that the following N t (j) refers to the pro…t after the arrival of the next innovation. 24 Recall that R&D rent is not captured by Northern leaders or their Southern a¢ liates.
The no-arbitrage condition that determines the value of v F t (j) is given by
This condition equates the real interest rate r t to the asset return per unit of asset. The asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic pro…ts in the South, (b) any potential capital gain _ v (17). Together with L N r;t (j) being linearly increasing in q t (j), the arrival rate of innovation ' N t (j) is independent of q t (j). Therefore, we follow the standard treatment in this class of models to focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which ' N t (j) = ' N t . 25 Similarly, the property that v F t (j) and L F r;t (j) are linearly increasing in q t (j) implies that ' F t (j) is independent of q t (j). Therefore, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which '
Monetary authority
The monetary policy instrument in the North (South) is the domestic in ‡ation rate 
to each member of the domestic household in the North (South).
Due to the semi-endogenous-growth property of this model, the long-run growth rate of total consumption C t is exogenously given by g L =( 1). Therefore, from the Euler equation (3), the real interest rate in the steady state is also exogenous and given by r = +g L =( 1). Consequently, there is an one-to-one relationship between the nominal interest rate and the in ‡ation rate in the long run such that
Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fc the market-clearing condition for consumption goods holds; the market-clearing conditions for labor hold in both countries; and …nally, the nominal exchange rate is determined by the law of one price such that
3 Steady-state equilibrium
In this section, we proceed to solve the steady-state equilibrium in the following steps. First, we derive the steady-state number of each type of industries and the steady-state expression of the quality index. Then, we derive the steady-state labor market conditions in the two countries. Finally, we put all these conditions together to derive the steady-state equilibrium rates of technology transfer and innovation.
Industry composition and quality dynamics
In the intermediate goods sector, there are three types of industries in which intermediate goods are produced respectively by Northern quality leaders, Southern a¢ liates, and Southern competitive …rms. We use f N ; F ; S g to denote the steady-state measure of these three types of industries. To solve for these three endogenous variables, we use the following conditions. First, the measure of all industries adds up to one.
In the steady state, the ‡ows in and out of each type of industry must be equal. The ‡ow into industries S dominated by Southern competitive …rms is F given by the measure of industries in which Southern a¢ liates'technologies are imitated. The ‡ow out of industries S dominated by Southern competitive …rms is S ' N given by the measure of these competitive industries experiencing the arrival of new innovations in the North. Therefore, the second condition is
The ‡ow into industries F dominated by Southern a¢ liates is N ' F given by the measure of industries in the North experiencing successful R&D adaptation. The ‡ow out of industries F dominated by Southern a¢ liates is the sum of (a) given by the measure of industries in which Southern a¢ liates'technologies are imitated. Therefore, the third condition is
Solving (26), (27) and (28) yields
The aggregate quality index across industries j 2 [0; 1] is
where z 1 is a composite parameter that is increasing in the quality step size z. This quality index can be decomposed into the following three components:
Lemma 1 provides the steady-state expression for the share of each of these three components of aggregate quality.
Lemma 1
In the steady state, the three components of aggregate quality can be expressed as
Proof. See Appendix A.
Northern labor market
The market-clearing condition for labor in the North is given by
The amount of labor employed for production by Northern quality leaders is
where the …rst equality uses (16) . The amount of labor employed for innovative R&D is
which uses (19) and the symmetry condition '
We de…ne x N t as the average quality per Northern worker such that
Finally, substituting (34), (38) and (39) into (37) yields the steady-state Northern labormarket condition expressed in per-capita terms given by
where we also have used
Southern labor market
The market-clearing condition for labor in the South is given by
The amount of labor employed for production by Southern competitive …rms is
where the …rst equality uses (16) . The amount of labor employed for production by Southern a¢ liates is
where the …rst equality also uses (16) . The amount of labor employed for adaptive R&D by Southern a¢ liates is
where the …rst equality uses (21) and the symmetry condition ' (36) and (42)- (44) into (41) yields the steady-state Southern labor market condition expressed in per-capita terms given by
which uses (14), (15) and L S t = sL t . It is useful to note that ( ) is increasing in .
Innovation and technology transfer
We …rst derive the growth rate of the quality index. Di¤erentiating (32) with respect to time yields
Then, taking the log of x N t = Q t =L N t and di¤erentiating with respect to time yields
In the steady state, x N t is stationary implying that the steady-state arrival rate of innovation is
which is determined by exogenous parameters in this semi-endogenous growth model. As discussed in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) , the law of motion in (47) implies that any increase (decrease) in the steady-state level of x N must be associated with a temporary increase (decrease) in ' N t during the transition path. Therefore, if a parameter increases (decreases) x N in the long run, it must have increased (decreased) ' N t in the short run. Using (24) and (25), one can show that the balanced-growth values of assets are
Substituting (17), (19) and (49) into (20) yields the following steady-state innovative R&D condition:
where the second equality is obtained by multiplyingL
. Similarly, substituting (18) , (19) , (20), (21) and (50) into (22) yields the following steadystate adaptive R&D condition:
where ! w N t =w S t is the relative wage between the two countries. Using (13) and (14), we deriveL
Substituting (51) and (52) into (53) yields the following steady-state relative-wage condition:
which is an implicit function determining the steady-state equilibrium value of the relative wage !(i N ; i S ). It can be shown using (54) that !(i N ; i S ) is decreasing in i N and increasing in i S . Given > 1, it is easy to show that ! > 1. Then, to ensure that z > !, 28 we impose the following parameter restriction: 27 Derivations are available upon request. 28 z > ! is equivalent to w S = > w N =z.
Substituting (51) into (40) to eliminateL N y;t =L t yields the Northern steady-state condition given by
The Northern steady-state condition contains two endogenous variables fx N ; ' F g 29 and is positively sloped in the (x N ; ' F ) space with a positive x N -intercept. Substituting (52) into (45) to eliminateL F y;t =L t yields the Southern steady-state condition given by 
Social welfare
In this section, we derive the steady-state level of social welfare in each country, which we will use to simulate the welfare e¤ects of the CIA constraints in the quantitative analysis. 29 Recall that ' N = g L = ( 1) and
are determined by exogenous parameters in the steady state. 30 Recall that !(i N ; i S ) in (54) and i S = S + + g L =( 1) are also determined by exogenous parameters in the steady state. 31 These conditions are the same as the ones in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) when = 1 and
Imposing balanced growth on (1) yields the steady-state welfare of the Northern household given by
where g c = g L =( 1) is determined by exogenous parameters due to semi-endogenous growth. Therefore, the steady-state welfare is determined by the balanced-growth level of consumption. Substituting the lump-sum transfer N t from the government into (2) yields
Therefore, the balanced-growth level of consumption c 
Lemma 2
The balanced-growth level of consumption can be expressed as
where L N 0 is exogenous and f ; I N ; I S g are given by 32 Interest income i N b N appears in the budget of the household because together with R&D labor income (captured by wage income w N ), it represents the factor income from R&D that is paid to the household.
The intuition of the above expressions can be explained as follows. Recall that real wages are given by w 
In ‡ation and the CIA constraints
This section explores the e¤ects of in ‡ation via the CIA constraints. Section 4.1 analyzes the e¤ects of in ‡ation in the two countries on the rates of innovation and international technology transfer. Section 4.2 calibrates the model to data for a quantitative analysis.
Qualitative analysis
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of in ‡ation. A higher in ‡ation in the South (i.e., an increase in S and i S ) a¤ects only the Southern steady-state condition in (56). Speci…cally, it shifts the South curve to the left in Figure 1 . As a result, both '
F and x N decrease along with an increase in ! as implied by (54). Intuitively, a higher nominal interest rate i S in the South raises the cost of adaptive R&D and reduces the rate of international technology transfer '
F . The decrease in the number of products manufactured by Southern a¢ liates implies more products being produced by Northern …rms. The higher demand for production labor causes a reallocation of labor in the North from R&D to production. The decrease in innovative R&D in the North decreases the rate of innovation in the short run and leads to a lower average quality per worker x N in the long run. Finally, given that the increase in S and i S has a direct negative e¤ect on the demand for Southern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in the South relative to the North. We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 A higher in ‡ation in the South leads to (a) a permanent decrease in the rate of technology transfer from the North to the South, (b) a permanent increase in the North-South wage gap, and (c) a temporary decrease in the rate of innovation in the North.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A higher in ‡ation in the North (i.e., an increase in N and i N ) a¤ects both the Northern and Southern steady-state conditions in (55) and (56). Speci…cally, it shifts both the South curve and the North curve to the left in Figure 1 . As a result, the e¤ect on ' F is ambiguous, and x N decreases along with a decrease in ! as implied by (54). Intuitively, an increase in the nominal interest rate i N in the North raises the cost of innovative R&D. As a result, the rate of innovation decreases in the short run, and the average quality per worker x N decreases in the long run. Given that the increase in N and i N has a direct negative e¤ect on the demand for Northern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in the North relative to the South.
As for the e¤ect of i N on the rate of international technology transfer ' F , there are two opposing e¤ects. To see this, we use ' 
where the second equality uses
In the steady state, Q N t =Q t is given by (34) , and hence, (60) can be reexpressed as
where the left-hand side is monotonically increasing in ' F . From (61), we see that the Northern nominal interest rate i N a¤ects ' F via the quality level per worker x N and the number of adaptive R&D workers L F r;t . On the one hand, an increase in i N reduces x N and has a positive e¤ect on ' F by decreasing the di¢ culty of adaptive R&D. On the other hand, the increase in i N also reduces the incentives for adaptive R&D by changing the asset values. To see this, we combine (49) and (50) to derive
where the second equality uses (17)- (18) and then (13)- (14) . Recall that the increase in i N reduces the relative wage ! = w N t =w S t ; therefore, it also reduces v F t (j)=v N t (j). In other words, the decrease in the North-South wage gap makes adaptive R&D less attractive relative to innovative R&D. This leads to a decrease in adaptive R&D in the South, which in turn has a negative e¤ect on the rate of international technology transfer '
F . This negative e¤ect of i N via the number of adaptive R&D workers in the South is relatively strong when the Southern population size s is large. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of i N on ' F would be negative if s is su¢ ciently large, and vice versa. We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 An increase in the nominal interest rate in the North leads to (a) a temporary decrease in the rate of innovation in the North, (b) a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap, and (c) a permanent decrease (increase) in the rate of technology transfer to the South if Southern population size is su¢ ciently large (small).
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we provide a quantitative analysis on the e¤ects of in ‡ation via the CIA constraints. Speci…cally, we explore their welfare implications. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to provide an illustrative numerical experiment to quantify the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation via the CIA constraints. For the parameter values, we either set them to conventional values in the literature or calibrate them using empirical moments from aggregate data of China and the US. We consider China as the South and the US as the North.
In the above qualitative analysis, we obtain the pattern of production shifting back to the North upon the arrival of new innovations by imposing z > ! using the parameter restriction in (P1). The condition z > ! allows the model to deliver a realistic pattern of o¤shoring and reshoring between the US and China. 33 For the quality step size z, we consider a conventional value of 1.2. For !, we consider recent data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data on relative income between the US and China, and this value is 5.94 between 2010 and 2013. Then, we choose a value of = 0:2 such that the condition z > ! holds.
For the discount rate , we follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to set it to 0.05. For the imitation rate , we set it to a value of 0.03. In the model, it is = (rather than the individual values of and ) that determines the values of variables in equilibrium. 34 We calibrate = by matching the relative wage ! from the model to the data discussed above. For the substitution elasticity , we calibrate it by using the innovation arrival rate ' N of 0.06. The calibrated value of is 3.16, which is within the range of empirical estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006) . For the remaining parameters, we calibrate them to data from 1995 to 2013. For the population growth rate g L , we set it to the average growth rate of the number of R&D scientists and engineers in the US, and this value is 0.029. 35 For the relative Southern population size s, we set it to 0.82 based on data from the Penn World Table on the population size of China and the US. We calibrate the values of the R&D externality parameters f N ; S g by using the R&D shares of GDP in the US and in China. According to the OECD Research and Development Statistics, the average R&D share of GDP is 0.011 in China and 0.026 in the US. Finally, we calibrate i S and i N using average in ‡ation rates in China and the US, and S is 3.06% and N is 2.41% according to the Federal Reserve Economic Data. Under these calibrated parameter values, the equilibrium values of fx N ; ' F g are respectively 0.63 and 0.03, and the equilibrium values of fr; g c g are respectively 0.063 and 0.013. We provide a summary of the calibrated parameter values in Table 1 . 33 For example, in a survey, the Boston Consulting Group (2011) document that "[t]ransportation goods such as vehicles and auto parts, electrical equipment including household appliances, and furniture are among seven sectors that could create 2 to 3 million jobs as a result of manufacturing returning to the U.S." 34 x N is the only variable a¤ected by , but the equilibrium value of x N is independent of . Given that it is the value of x N that matters, we simply normalize to one when reporting the value of x N . 35 There are di¤erent ways to calibrate g L . It can be calibrated to the population growth rate, the laborforce growth rate and the growth rate of R&D labor. Given that innovation is the most important element of the model, we calibrate g L to the growth rate of R&D labor.
Given these calibrated parameter values, we consider the following experiments: (a) decreasing in ‡ation in the US to achieve a zero nominal interest rate (i.e., i N = 0), and (b) decreasing in ‡ation in China to achieve a zero nominal interest rate (i.e., i S = 0). The results are reported in Table 2 . We …nd that a permanent decrease in in ‡ation in the US would raise the wage gap ! by 0.471% (percent change) and decrease international technology transfer '
F by 1.257% (percent change). Here ' F decreases despite an increase in adaptive R&D because of the increase in the quality index x N , which makes technology transfer more di¢ cult. The e¤ect of x N on ' F dominates because s is not su¢ ciently large despite the rather large population in China. The decrease in i N leads to a welfare gain of 3.281% in the US and a welfare gain of 3.312% in China. 36 From Section 3.5, we see that the percent change in c N 0 is equal to the percent change in w N 0 plus the percent change in I N . Table 2 shows that when i N decreases, w N 0 increases by 3.689% whereas c N 0 increases by 3.281%, implying that I N decreases slightly by 0.408%. Therefore, the quantitatively signi…cant welfare gain as a result of the decrease in i N is mostly due to the large increase in wage, which in turn is due to the large increase in the level of technology x N by 8.068% (percent change). A permanent decrease in in ‡ation in China would reduce the wage gap ! by 0.469% and increase technology transfer ' F by 1.492%. Also, it leads to a welfare gain of 0.338% in China and a welfare gain of 0.174% in the US. In this case, the welfare gains in the two countries are relatively small because the increase in wage is small, which in turn is due to the small increase in the level of technology x N by 0.361%. In other words, although decreasing in ‡ation in either China or the US leads to an increase in innovation and the technology level, in ‡ation in the US has much larger e¤ects on innovation and global welfare. 
Sensitivity analysis: increasing US R&D share of GDP
Starting from this subsection, we perform sensitivity analysis by considering a number of robustness checks. First, we examine data on R&D share of GDP in the US. As Comin (2004) argues, data on R&D expenditures reported by …rms may not capture all the resources devoted to innovation-related activities in the US. Here we consider a rough exercise by doubling the R&D share of GDP in the US from 0.026 to 0.052. Table 3 reports the recalibrated parameter values, whereas Table 4 reports the new simulation results. In this case, the R&D externality parameter N decreases to 0.74, which in turn implies a slightly smaller welfare gain from decreasing in ‡ation in either country. The welfare gains of decreasing in ‡ation in 36 Welfare changes are all expressed in the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
the US remain quantitatively signi…cant at 2.90% in the US and 3.22% in China. Therefore, we still …nd that in ‡ation can cause a quantitatively signi…cant cross-country welfare e¤ect from the US to China. 
Sensitivity analysis: increasing the innovation-arrival rate
In our benchmark calibration, we have chosen a conservatively low value for the innovation arrival rate. In this subsection, we consider a larger innovation innovation-arrival rate ' N of 0.10 and recalibrate the rest of the parameters. Here we use our benchmark R&D share of 0.026 in order to isolate the e¤ect of ' N . Table 5 reports the recalibrated parameter values, whereas Table 6 reports the new simulation results. In this case, the R&D externality parameter N increases to 0.93, which in turn implies an even larger welfare gain from decreasing in ‡ation. Speci…cally, the welfare gains of decreasing in ‡ation in the US become 5.69% in the US and 5.86% in China. 
Sensitivity analysis: decreasing the innovation-arrival rate
From the previous analysis, we see that the magnitude of the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation depends on the R&D externality parameter, which in turn is the most sensitive to the assumed value of the innovation-arrival rate. Therefore, we now consider an unusually low value of 0.02 for the innovation arrival rate ' N , which implies a time between innovation arrivals of 50 years. Table 7 reports the recalibrated parameter values, whereas Table 8 reports the new simulation results. In this case, the R&D externality parameter N decreases to 0.50, which in turn implies a smaller welfare gain from decreasing in ‡ation. Even in this case, the welfare gains of decreasing in ‡ation in the US remain non-negligible at 1.20% in the US and 0.98% in China. Therefore, our …nding remains robust that in ‡ation can indeed cause a quantitatively signi…cant welfare e¤ect across countries. 
Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the e¤ects of in ‡ation via CIA constraints on R&D in a Schumpeterian economy with North-South product cycles. We show that in ‡ation a¤ects innovation, technology transfer and the allocation of manufacturing activities across countries. Calibrating the model to China-US data, we …nd that the cross-country welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation is quantitatively signi…cant from the US to China, but less so from China to the US. The reason is that innovation originates from the North in the model, which until recently is a reasonable approximation to reality as OECD countries perform the majority of global R&D. However, as China and other developing countries become more innovative, the e¤ect of Southern in ‡ation on global welfare is likely to become more signi…cant. Let's de…ne Q (35) and (36) follow.
Proof of Lemma 2. Time arguments are omitted for convenience. Using
Substituting this condition into the balanced-growth version of (2) yields 
which uses (19) , (39) is de…ned in Lemma 2, and we have derived (58). Applying analogous derivations to the Southern asset condition, one can also derive (59) by noting that m Proof of Proposition 1. It is easy to graphically show from (54) that ! increases with i S , proving (b). Given this, an increase in i S leads to a downward shift in the South curve (56), whereas it has no e¤ect on the North curve (55). Applying a simple graphical analysis to Figure 1 , we …nd that an increase in i S leads to permanent decreases in ' F and x N . This proves (a) and also (c) because a permanent decrease in x N must be associated with a temporary decrease in the innovation rate ' N t below its steady-state level ' N = g L =( 1) given the dynamics in (47).
Proof of Proposition 2.
Graphical analysis with (54) implies that ! decreases with i N , proving (b). An increase in i N leads to a downward shift in both the North and South curves, (55) and (56), given that we can easily show from (54) that 1 + i N ! increases with i N . Thus, an increase in i N leads to a decrease in x N , implying a temporary decrease in the innovation rate ' N t given the dynamics in (47) and proving (a). As for (c), we solve (55) and (56) for '
F to obtain 37
Di¤erentiating (A3) with respect to i N , we …nd that d' F =di N > (<) 0 holds if the following inequality holds:
Given that the right-hand side of (A4) is monotonically increasing in s, d' F =di N > (<) 0 becomes more likely to hold as s decreases (increases). Given that s has an upper bound s, 39 which ensures ' F > 0, we can show that the inequality < in (A4) must hold as s !s implying that d' F =di N < 0 for a su¢ ciently large s. As s ! 0, the right-hand side of (A4) becomes negative. Therefore, d' F =di N > 0 holds if the left-hand side of (A4) is positive, which is guaranteed by = > z' N =( + ' N ) given that z > !. 37 Here we have used the following condition derived from (54):
38 Here have used the following condition derived from (54):
39 This is de…ned by
